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Criminal Law’s Tribalism 
MOLLY TOWNES O’BRIEN† 
Science advanced, knowledge grew, nature was mastered, 
but Reason did not conquer and tribalism did not go away.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In every country where the question has been studied, incarceration 
rates for members of some minority groups greatly exceed those for the 
majority population.  Disproportionate incarceration is not a problem of a 
single ethnic group or one of a set of historical circumstances.  It is a 
global problem that is fundamentally connected to social group identity.   
This Article explores the role that criminal law serves in group-identity 
formation.  It suggests that although in-group bias is a deeply embedded 
aspect of criminal justice systems, it may have outlived its usefulness on an 
increasingly small planet.  Building a common or super-group identity may 
be necessary to achieve greater justice in increasingly multi-ethnic and 
mobile societies. 
From the available data on the race or ethnicity of the world’s 
prisoners,2 it is possible to discern a global tendency of each population to 
imprison a disproportionate percentage of some minority groups.3  African-
Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately represented in American 
prisons.4  Aboriginal Australians are incarcerated at fourteen times the rate 
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1 HAROLD R. ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE TRIBE: GROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE 25 (1975). 
2 Many countries do not keep data on the race or ethnicity of prisoners. In those countries that do 
keep data, the differing definitions of racial and ethnic groups make it difficult to draw transnational 
comparisons. Nevertheless, in every country where data is available, it appears that some minority 
groups are disproportionately imprisoned. See generally World Prison Brief, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE 
FOR PRISON STUDIES (Aug. 30 2011) (providing international prison statistics by country), 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/; see also Roy Walmsley, Global Incarceration and 
Prison Trends, 3 FORUM ON CRIME AND SOCIETY 65, 65–69 (2003) (providing data on international 
imprisonment rates and trends). 
3 Within any society, not all minority groups experience higher levels of incarceration. Rather, 
higher levels of incarceration are found to apply to stigmatized or oppressed minorities. For an 
excellent discussion of racial stigma, see generally R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, 
Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 803 (2004). 
4  According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, at midyear 2010, “whites represented 44.3% 
of all jail inmates, blacks represented 37.8%, and Hispanics represented 15.8%. These jail inmate 
distributions have remained nearly stable since midyear 2000.” Todd D. Minton, Jail Inmates at 
Midyear 2010 – Statistical Tables, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1 (April 
14, 2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim10st.pdf.  Of the total population in 
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of white Australians.5  In New Zealand, where Maori make up 15 percent 
of the population, they make up 51.2 percent of the prison population.6   
Unequal imprisonment of minority groups has also been documented in the 
Czech Republic, Britain, France, Israel, Sweden, Canada, and Germany.7  
As Michael Tonry points out,  
 
What is most striking about [the data demonstrating 
overrepresentation of minorities in prison] is that they come 
from so many countries. They apply to many groups and 
many countries, suggesting that bias, disparities, and disparate 
impact policy dilemmas are not uniquely the characteristics 
and problems of any particular minority groups or countries 
but are endemic to heterogeneous developed countries in 
which some groups are substantially less successful 
economically and socially than the majority population.8 
 
Further, incarceration rates around the globe are rising, making the 
disproportionate impact of criminal punishment on minority groups a 
matter of growing importance.9   
Data demonstrating the disproportionate imprisonment of oppressed 
minority populations abounds as does empirical research that seeks to 
explain the data.  Much of this research focuses on the issue of what has 
been described as the “elevated rates of offending (according to official 
statistics) among oppressed racial minorities . . . .”10  In other words, for 
                                                                                                                          
2010, blacks represent only 12.6%.  Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010, 4 tbl.1, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU  (AUG. 30, 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.   
5 The age standardised imprisonment rate for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander prisoners at 30 
June 2010 was 1,892 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander prisoners per 100,000 adult Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander population. The equivalent rate for non-Indigenous prisoners was 134 non-
Indigenous prisoners per 100,000 adult non-Indigenous population. 
The rate of imprisonment for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander prisoners was 14 times higher 
than the rate for non-Indigenous prisoners at 30 June 2010, no change from the rate in 2009.  
Prisoners in Australia, 2010, AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS (Dec. 9, 2010), 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Products/12CF5E952D0E70C6CA2577F3000F0AEC?opend
ocument. 
6 Facts and Statistics, March 2011, N.Z. DEP’T OF CORRS., http://www.corrections.govt.nz/about-
us/facts_and_statistics/prisons/march_2014.html#total (Aug. 30 2011); Simone Bull, The Land of 
Murder, Cannibalism, and All Kinds of Atrocious Crimes? Maori and Crime in New Zealand, 1853–
1919, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 496, 496 (2004). 
7 Michael T. Costelloe, et al., The Social Correlates of Punitiveness Toward Criminals: A 
Comparison of the Czech Republic and Florida, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 191, 207–09 (2002) (Gypsies in the 
Czech Republic); Alina Korn, Rates of Incarceration and Main Trends in Israeli Prisons, 3 CRIME  & 
JUSTICE 29, 37–41 tbl. 1 (2003) (Palestinians in Israel).  See generally 21 CRIME & JUSTICE (Michael 
Tonry, ed. 1997) (immigrants in Germany, England and Wales, Sweden, Canada and France).   
8  Michael Tonry, Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration, in 21 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 19 (1997). 
9 Walmsley, supra note 2, at 70 (describing global trends in increasing incarceration). 
10 Coretta Phillips & Benjamin Bowling, Racism, Ethnicity and Criminology: Developing 
Minority Perspectives, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 269, 269 (2003). 
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many researchers the question is:  Why do minority group members 
commit more crimes?  Pursuing the answer to this question has led 
researchers to explore the criminogenic influence of socioeconomic 
deprivation and social disorganization.11  Others have considered whether 
crime may have genetic or biological factors.12  
At the other end of the spectrum are researchers who question whether 
the official crime rate and imprisonment statistics are reflective of actual 
rates of criminal behavior.  These scholars have considered whether 
discriminatory law enforcement, criminal justice processing, or sentencing 
patterns account for elevated levels of minority imprisonment.13  Similarly, 
researchers have also considered whether the law itself contributes to the 
disproportionate imprisonment of minority groups through the 
establishment of behavioral norms that do not reflect the values of the 
minority culture.14 
The debate, which has sometimes been characterized as “polemical” 
and “sterile”,15 has not ignored the possibility that the causes of 
disproportionate incarceration are not mutually exclusive—that is, that a 
variety of factors may all contribute to the overrepresentation of some 
minorities in prison.16  Much of the research, however, has focused 
predominantly on one nation or one criminal justice system.17  Studies 
                                                                                                                          
11 ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 131 (Metropolitan Books et al., 1st ed.  
1998); Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: 
A Meta-Analysis, in 32 CRIME & JUSTICE 373, 373–79 (2005); CLIFFORD R. SHAW ET AL., 
DELINQUENCY AREAS 8–9 (1929). 
12 Thomas A. Regulus, Race, Class and Sociobiological Perspectives on Crime, in ETHNICITY, 
RACE AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ACROSS TIME AND PLACE 46–47 (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 1995); 
JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 62 (1985). 
13 Hans-Jorg Albrecht, Ethnic Minorities, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Germany, in 21 CRIME 
AND JUSTICE 31, 69-85 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997) (examining research in Germany relating to 
discriminatory processing and sentencing of foreigners); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by 
Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 296, 303 (2001) (examining discriminatory processing of African Americans in the U.S.); 
William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1825 (1998) (discussing the 
frequent police presence and arrests in predominately poor black communities due to elevated risks of 
illegal drug trade); P.A. J. Waddington et al., In Proportion: Race, and Police Stop and Search, 44 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 889, 890, 911 (2004) (considering police stop and search procedures in the 
United Kingdom). 
14 Zoann K. Snyder-Joy, Self-Determination and American Indian Justice: Tribal versus Federal 
Jurisdiction on Indian Lands, in ETHNICITY, RACE, AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ACROSS TIME AND 
PLACE 310, 316–18 (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 1995); THORSTEN SELLIN, CULTURE CONFLICT AND 
CRIME: A REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DELINQUENCY OF THE COMMITTEE ON PERSONALITY 
AND CULTURE (1938).  
15 Phillips & Bowling, supra note 10, at 270. 
16 Theodore G. Chiricos & Charles Crawford, Race and Imprisonment: A Contextual Assessment 
of the Evidence, in ETHNICITY, RACE AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ACROSS TIME AND PLACE 281, 281 
(Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 1995). 
17 There are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Costelloe, et al., supra note 7, at 191–92 
(comparing sentencing patterns and ethnic antipathy in the Czech Republic and Florida); Pratt & 
Cullen, supra note 11, at 375 (comparing criminological from multiple jurisdictions); David Jacobs & 
Richard Kleban, Political Institutions, Minorities, and Punishment: A Pooled Cross-National Analysis 
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therefore present findings that may appear to be limited to the particular 
racial groups or ethnic minorities studied.  Each study, taken alone, may 
create a false perception that the problem of disproportionate incarceration 
is a characteristic of one minority group, one historical or political 
situation, or one kind of culture clash.  The problem may therefore be 
falsely perceived as one of “Aboriginal criminality” or “racism in the 
United States.”  Thus, a potential risk of looking at a single nation or 
criminal justice system is that the research itself may contribute to existing 
stereotypes, misconceptions and biases against the oppressed minority.18   
This risk is not, of course, a sufficient reason not to perform the research; a 
significant body of work addresses the issues of racialized punishment 
without falling into the trap of stereotyping.19  Such work may be 
extremely useful, not only to improve understanding of the problem of 
over-incarceration of certain minority groups, but also to assist in 
formulating strategies for reducing minority imprisonment rates within one 
culture or country.  It is limited, however, in scope and implication to the 
culture or cultures studied. 
Some scholars advocate taking a comparative or cross-national 
approach to considering the problem of overrepresentation of certain ethnic 
minorities in prison, but do so only with great caution.20  There are good 
reasons to proceed with caution into the realm of making cross-national 
generalizations or undertaking studies of ethnic minority incarceration.  
Differences in the history of various minority groups and their 
relationships with majority cultures, differences in the economic and 
political structure of various societies, and differences in the criminal 
justice systems of each country, all undoubtedly play an important role in 
producing outcomes that are idiosyncratic and not susceptible to a single 
explanatory theory.  Further, empirical research faces enormous difficulty 
in collecting and comparing data from sources that use differing definitions 
of minority or ethnic group status, and of criminal behavior, etc.21 
It is nevertheless important to explore the implication of what has been 
                                                                                                                          
of Imprisonment Rates, 82 SOC. FORCES 725, 726 (2003) (a cross-national analysis of theories of ethnic 
crime); Rick Ruddell & Martin G. Urbina, Minority Threat and Punishment: A Cross-National 
Analysis, 21 JUST. Q. 903, 904 (2004). 
18 Darnell F. Hawkins, Ethnicity, Race, and Crime: A Review of Selected Studies, in ETHNICITY, 
RACE, AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ACROSS TIME AND PLACE 11, 35–36 (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 
1995). 
19 See, e.g., CHRIS CUNNEEN, CONFLICT, POLITICS AND CRIME: ABORIGINAL COMMUNITIES AND 
THE POLICE 24–25 (Allen & Unwin eds., 2001); Angela Yvonne Davis, Race and Criminalization: 
Black Americans and the Punishment Industry, in THE ANGELA Y. DAVIS READER 61, 62–63 (Joy 
James ed., 1998). 
20 Robert F. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration: Comparative and 
Cross National Perspectives, in 21 CRIME & JUSTICE 311, 312 (1997) (discussing the perils of research 
on race, ethnicity and crime in the United States); Tonry, supra note 8, at 4–11 (pointing out problems 
in multi-national comparisons). 
21 Tonry, supra note 8, at 1–6. 
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demonstrated in numerous single-nation studies: In every country where 
the question has been studied, the “crime and incarceration rates for 
members of some minority groups greatly exceed those for the majority 
population.”22  If disproportionate incarceration (or punishment) of some 
disfavored minorities is found everywhere, the obvious implication is that 
the problem is not particular to one ethnic group.  Nor is it fundamentally a 
problem of one race or one historical racial conflict.  The members of 
oppressed minority groups around the world include not only African 
Americans, Maori, Australian Aboriginals and other people of color, but 
also Turks (in Germany), Roma people, and Armenians, who are “white.”23  
Disproportionate punishment impacts immigrant groups, but also extends 
to first peoples who have occupied the territory where they live for 
thousands of years, including Native Americans, Kurdish people, 
Australian Aboriginals, and Torres Strait Islanders.24  Neither is 
disproportionate imprisonment found only in the wake of capitalist post-
industrialism or post-colonialism, as demonstrated by the high rate of 
incarceration of Uyghur people in China.25  The disproportionate 
imprisonment of some disfavored minorities appears to be a global 
phenomenon.  While theories of disparate incarceration that focus on 
racism, immigration, capitalism and colonialism may have strong 
explanatory power at the level of a single legal system, they cannot explain 
the global phenomenon.   
One may argue that any attempt to understand disparate punishment at 
a global level must founder on the rocks of particularized histories, 
individual cultural and legal differences, and varying economic and 
political circumstances.  It would not be possible to gather appropriate data 
or test a global theory of disproportionate incarceration.  Such a global 
theory would be vulnerable to the same critique that has been leveled at 
conflict theory: It would “explain everything and predict nothing.”26  On 
the other hand, it may be that criminology has already grasped the global 
nature of disproportionate punishment, but has not made it a point of 
emphasis because of the difficulties of studying global phenomena.   
This Article does not attempt to create a grand theory for 
understanding disparate imprisonment in all of its various historical and 
                                                                                                                          
22 Id. at 12. 
23 See generally CRIME & JUSTICE, supra note 7 (discussing the disproportionate punishment of 
minorities in various countries). 
24 Tonry, supra note 8, at 6; Thomas J. Young, Commentary, Native American Crime and 
Criminal Justice Require Criminologists’ Attention, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 111, 111–12 (1990). 
25 See Uyghur Rights and Writers, INTERNATIONAL PEN UYGHUR CENTER (Aug. 28, 2011, 1:48 
PM),   http://www.uyghurpen.org/writers-in-prison.html.  Chinese imprisonment rates are very difficult 
to study because of the lack reliable statistical information.  The discrimination against Uyghur people 
is, however, widely acknowledged and is described to include disproportionate incarceration. 
26 CHARIS E. KUBRIN ET AL., RESEARCHING THEORIES OF CRIME AND DEVIANCE 239 (2009). 
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cultural manifestations.  Rather it suggests that by shifting focus from the 
particular to the global, from the cultural or racial to the human, it may be 
possible to gain new insights.  Turning to some of the traditional and basic 
building blocks of criminology—anthropology and psychology—this paper 
draws attention to the fact that, although certain ethnic, racial and migrant 
groups are at the receiving end of disparate punishment, the problem is 
global.  It may be beneficial to address the problem from a global or 
human, rather than jurisdictional perspective.    
II. HUMAN UNIVERSALS AND GROUP IDENTIFICATION 
Anthropologists tell us that some things are universal to all humans. 
For example, all human societies have language, dance, music, jokes.  In 
all human societies, people suck their wounds.  We show surprise, fear and 
happiness through facial expressions.  More fundamentally for this 
discussion, human beings are not solitary dwellers.  We live in groups, 
develop group identity, and maintain group unity.27   In George Vold’s 
description of human nature, “people are fundamentally group-involved 
beings whose lives are both a part of and a product of their group 
associations.”28 
Although human groups may be structured in a wide variety of ways, 
an “important consequence of group structuring is the delineation of in-
group from out-groups.”29   According to Isaacs, “[t]his fragmentation of 
human society is a pervasive fact in human affairs and always has been.”30  
Sumner, who contributed the concept of ethnocentrism to social science, 
conceived of it first in the context of a “primitive society.”31 
 
The conception of the “primitive society” which we 
ought to form is that of small groups scattered over a 
territory. . . .  A group of groups may have some relation to 
each other (kin, neighborhood, alliance, connubium and 
commercium) which draws them together and 
differentiates them from others.  Thus a differentiation 
arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and 
everybody else, or the others groups, out-groups.  The 
insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, 
law, government, and industry, to each other . . . .Each 
                                                                                                                          
27 DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 130–37 (1991). 
28 GEORGE B. VOLD & THOMAS J. BERNARD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 271 (3rd ed. 1986). 
29 Muzafer Sherif, A Preliminary Experimental Study of Inter-group Relations, in SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS 388, 395 (John H. Rohner & Muzafer Sherif eds., 1951). 
30 ISAACS, supra  note 1, at 2. 
31 WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF 
USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS MORES, AND MORALS 12 (1979).  
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group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself 
superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt 
on outsiders.  Each group thinks its own folkways [are] the 
only right ones, and if it observes that others have other 
folkways, these excite its scorn.  Opprobrious epithets are 
derived from these differences. “Pig-eater,” “cow-eater,” 
“uncircumcised,” “jabberers,” are epithets of contempt and 
abomination.32 
 
Since 1906, Sumner’s description of “primitive society” has attracted 
the criticism of anthropologists, who point out that group alliances and 
ethnic identities are unstable in some societies, and sociologists, who note 
that individuals may belong to more than one group and may admire some 
out-groups.33  The boundary, influence, and meaning of Sumner’s 
“ethnocentrism” are contested in the social sciences. Nevertheless, the 
phenomenon of self-categorization and establishment of in-group and out-
group identities is widely accepted and has been demonstrated in dozens of 
psychological studies in a variety of cultures.34  In-group self-
categorization can be thought of as pro-social, providing for group 
cohesion, cooperation, and political agency.35  It is also present at the core 
of inter-group conflict, stigmatization of minority group members, and 
social alienation.36  
A salient aspect of group identification is that, once we identify as a 
group member, we immediately form an in-group preference.37  We derive 
part of our self-esteem from group membership and tend to ascribe positive 
characteristics to our own group and negative characteristics to others.38  
As we identify with a group organized around any value, activity or status, 
we not only automatically attribute positive qualities to our own group and 
negative qualities to the out-group, but also act in ways that favor our own 
group.39  Surprisingly, experiments in social psychology demonstrate that 
even when people are assigned randomly to a group—in other words, when 
                                                                                                                          
32 Id. at 12–13. 
33 Robert A. LeVine, Ethnocentrism, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 4853 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). 
34 See, e.g., ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 541–42 (2nd ed. 1986) (describing self-
categorization); SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 186–88 (12th ed. 2006) 
(discussing a variety of studies relating to in-group and out-group categorization). 
35 JOHN C. TURNER, ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION 
THEORY 3 (1987); see also LISA GARCÍA BEDOLLA, FLUID BORDERS: LATINO POWER, IDENTITY, AND 
POLITICS IN LOS ANGELES 3–17 (2005) (illustrating group dynamics in the Latino population).  
36 See ROBERT A. LEVINE & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, ETHNOCENTRISM:  THEORIES OF CONFLICT, 
ETHNIC ATTITUDES AND GROUP BEHAVIOR 143–44 (1972). 
37 John C. Turner, Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group, in SOCIAL IDENTITY 
AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 15, 34–35 (Henri Tajfel, ed., 1982). 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 35. 
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the subject has no basis on which to differentiate between her own group 
and another group, in-group preference is still shown.40  According to 
Roger Brown, individuals show a consistent preference for “maximal in-
group advantage over the out-group.”41  In-group members will, for 
example, forego receiving a reward if their group will thereby gain greater 
comparative advantage over the out-group.42 
Moreover, subjects who demonstrated in-group preference were not 
aware of their bias and believed that they had behaved fairly.43  Most 
subjects “tr[ied] to introduce some level of fairness by rewarding both in-
group and out-group members” but nonetheless favored their own group.44 
Despite systematic biases toward providing greater rewards for their own 
group, subjects were unaware that they had, for example, assigned more 
points to members of their own group.45 
Similarly, cognitive processes linked to stereotyping and 
discrimination may be unconscious.  While some racism or discrimination 
is intentional, recent social science research reveals that unconscious bias 
is much more prevalent than intentional discrimination.46  Although people 
notice differences and naturally separate people and things by category, 
some differences form part of the “perceptual foreground” while others are 
part of the “perceptual background” which do not necessarily become part 
of conscious thought.47  Split-second decisions are often made on the basis 
of perceptual background categorizations.  Thus, we are susceptible to 
what has been termed “implicit bias”—the tendency to unconsciously 
associate our own group with pleasant traits and other groups with 
unpleasant ones, especially in split-second decision-making processes.48  
The phenomenon of “implicit bias” has been shown to be “extremely 
widespread” in psychological testing.49 
                                                                                                                          
40 BROWN, supra note 34, at 544–45. 
41 Id. at 550. 
42 Id. at 549–50. Group processes are also susceptible to a host of cognitive errors, including 
overgeneralization, over confidence, group polarization, miscalculation of risk, and others.  Sara Sun 
Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal 
Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 57–60 
(1997). 
43 See BROWN, supra note 34, at 544–48. 
44 TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 187. 
45 BROWN, supra note 34, at 545; TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 190. 
46 Lenhardt, supra note 3, at 847. 
47 Stephen C. Ainlay & Faye Crosby, Stigma, Justice and the Dilemma of Difference, in THE 
DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE 17, 21–22 (Stephen C. Ainlay, et al. eds. 1986). 
48 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 971–96 
(2006). 
49 Id. at 971. There are opportunities for in-group favoritism at virtually every level of the 
criminal justice process.  These opportunities exist at the creation of criminal law’s substantive norms, 
where the morality of the dominant group is encoded into legal proscription; at the creation of 
enforcement procedures and policies, where the dominant group’s perceptions about crime and 
criminality will control the allocation of resources, the methods of training police, prosecutors and 
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Of course, most in-groups are not created at random by social scientist 
researchers.  The phenomenon of group-identity creation takes place in 
society in the context of history and culture.  Real world in-groups and out-
groups may derive from a wide variety or combination of factors: 
birthplace, name, language, physical characteristics, history and origins, 
religion, and nationality.50  More importantly, real world manifestations of 
group-identity have real world effects, contributing to nationalism, 
patriotism, group cohesiveness, homogeneity, group solidarity, and social 
cooperation within the in-group; and stereotyping, prejudice, 
dehumanization, stigmatization and discrimination against the out-group.51  
As psycho-social processes of group identification and ethnocentrism 
combine with historical circumstance, economics and politics, dynamic 
social groups and inter-group relationships take form. Kotkin has used the 
term “global tribe” to refer to groups like the British, Japanese, Chinese, 
Indians, and Jews who have dispersed around the globe, but maintain a 
sense of group-identity.52  These metaphorical “tribes” have a sense of 
common origin and values, even though they are genetically diverse and 
live in many different climates, contexts and nations.53 Similarly, the 
metaphor of tribalism has been used to connote the process of group-
formation or de-individualization.54  “Tribalism”, “racism”, 
“ethnocentrism”, “nationalism”, “patriotism” all refer to various types of 
group identity formation.  Group identity formation and in-group 
preference is not a trait of any particular ethnic, racial, economic, or 
political group.  Rather, the motives are “deeply rooted”; they are “motives 
that are primitive and universal.”55  
Although the motivation for forming group identity is “deeply 
rooted,”56 the boundaries of the group may be fluid.57  Moreover, an 
individual is likely to be a member of numerous groups simultaneously 
(e.g., gender, family, clan, club, neighborhood, nation) and in the 
                                                                                                                          
judges; and the rules that govern police interaction with the public; and at the enforcement of 
substantive criminal norms, which necessarily give a decision-making discretion to police (to stop, 
search, investigate, arrest), prosecutors (to charge), judges (in bail and sentencing) and correctional 
institution officials (prison accommodations and parole). 
50 ISAACS, supra note 1, at 39–40. 
51 See generally LEVINE & CAMPBELL, supra note 36.  
52 See generally JOEL KOTKIN, TRIBES: HOW RACE, RELIGION, AND IDENTITY DETERMINE 
SUCCESS IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY (1st ed. 1993). 
53 Id. at 4–5. 
54 Michael Maffesoli, Juex des Masques: Postmodern Tribalism, 4 DESIGN ISSUES 141, 141–44 
(1988). 
55 See BROWN, supra note 34, at 542. 
56 Group identification systems may have been central to the evolution of multicellular life.  See  
LUIS P. VILLARREAL, ORIGIN OF GROUP IDENTITY: VIRUSES, ADDICTION AND COOPERATION v–vi 
(2009) (tracing the evolution of group identification systems from molecules to microbes and on 
through animals to the human social structure). 
57 BEDOLLA, supra note 35 at 3, 73. 
 40 CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1 
 
interaction between the individual and social contexts, a sense of group 
identity may change over time.58  Group identity is thus neither fixed nor 
unitary, but flexible and layered. 
III. FROM TRIBAL JUSTICE TO MODERN CRIMINAL LAW? 
Criminologists have long acknowledged the role that group conflict 
plays in the operation of the criminal law, but there is a tendency to place a 
conceptual distance between modern criminal law and “tribal justice.”  In 
The Social Reality of Crime, Richard Quinney traces the history of criminal 
law to the emergence of state power in Greek and Roman times, and again 
in the early twelfth century in England.59  As he describes it:  
 
The law of the Anglo-Saxons was originally a system 
of tribal justice.  Each tribe, as a group of kinsmen, was 
controlled by its own chief and armed warriors who met 
and, among other things, passed laws.  Any wrong was 
regarded as being against or by the family; and it was the 
family that atoned or carried out the blood-feud if an 
offense occurred between kinship groups.60 
 
According to Quinney, tribal justice yielded to a modern system of 
criminal law as the power of various feudal lords was consolidated under 
one king, united by Christianity, and finally brought under the control of a 
unified state.61  An alternate view of the same history suggests continuity 
rather than change.62  The size of the tribe and the factors unifying it 
changed, but the basic tribal form did not disappear.  The family-based 
tribe, held together by loyalty to a family group and a feudal lord, was 
replaced with a state-based tribe, held together by a common religion and 
loyalty to a king. 
The first two core characteristics of modern criminal law that are 
traditionally cited as distinguishing “true criminal law” from “elementary 
tort,” “primitive law” or tribal justice are (1) the transition from private to 
public justice in which offenses against individuals are conceived as 
offenses against the public; and (2) the transition to a system in which the 
state provides the means of punishment.63  The qualities of group decision-
making about social norms and aggregation of effort for enforcement are 
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60 Id. at 48. 
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62 See id. at 49. 
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both present in pre-modern justice systems.  The transitions to a public, 
state-run system can be seen as a shift in the size of the polity, rather than a 
change in the conceptual framework.  Even in feudal times or in places 
where human groups lived in loosely organized hunter-gatherer societies, 
individuals were not left alone to avenge wrongs against them.64  Rather, 
the family, clan or chief, or feudal lord provided the social organization 
that supported punishments or restitution.65  A wrong against an individual 
was taken as a wrong against the family, clan, or tribe.66  Social control and 
order is critical to the continued existence of any society, not merely those 
that are organized around state systems.67   
  The third core characteristic of modern criminal law traditionally 
cited as distinguishing it from tribal justice is its ready availability “to the 
entire body politic, and not restricted to particular groups or classes of 
citizens.”68 But, contrary to this optimistic view, modern criminal law, like 
its tribal predecessors, always serves a defined in-group.  Criminal law is 
traditionally jurisdictional and draws its protective boundaries around the 
members of the tribe.  Until the recent advent of transnational and 
international criminal law, criminal law enforcement has operated almost 
exclusively within the borders and norms of one jurisdiction and tribe.69  In 
this sense, it has been asserted that “law is an intragroup phenomenon.”70  
Moreover, when a single jurisdiction has been home to multiple groups, 
the protection of criminal law enforcement has not always guaranteed to 
minority resident groups.  As illustrated in the recent report dealing with 
sexual abuse of Aboriginal children in the Northern Territory of Australia, 
crimes may go unreported and reported crimes may go unprosecuted. 
Problems of communication, culture, and mutual suspicion may make it 
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difficult for citizens to report and for police and prosecutors to do their 
jobs.71  
Further, when the minority group is viewed as less than human, the 
protection of the minority group members may not be a law enforcement 
priority.  Anthropologists have repeatedly observed a “double standard in 
traditional morality”—with “one set of ethics for ingroup members [and] a 
lower set or no restraints for outgroup members”.72  Crimes against out-
group members do not carry the same moral weight as crimes committed 
against in-group members.  
In its protection of and preference for members of the tribe, modern 
criminal law is not necessarily so distant in concept and practice from 
ancient forms of tribal justice.73  
IV. THE ROLE OF GROUP IDENTITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
By identifying the disproportionate incarceration of some minority 
groups as a phenomenon, we implicitly accept and call attention to a 
minority group identity.  What may be less obvious, but no less important, 
is that we also imply a majority or dominant group identity.  In 1958 
George Vold presented his group conflict theory of crime, which 
conceived of the “whole [social] process of law making, law breaking and 
law enforcement” as a direct reflection of “deep-seated and fundamental 
conflicts” between interest groups and their “more general struggles among 
groups for control of police power and the state.”74  In succeeding years, 
conflict theorists have argued that “crime is a reality that exists primarily 
as it is created by those in society whose interests are best served by its 
presence.”75  If one considers criminal law from a group identity 
perspective, however, crime or criminal law is not only the product of 
dominant interests, but also a force that fosters group identity formation  
itself.  Criminal law plays a role in defining and reinforcing the identities 
and the power relationships of both the in-group and the out-group(s). 
A. Criminal Law is In-Group Self-Defining 
Criminal law can be seen as a tool for de-individualization or the 
collectivization of the ideals, aspirations, and power of a group.  In the 
                                                                                                                          
71 NORTHERN TERRITORY BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE PROTECTION OF ABORIGINAL CHILDREN 
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72 LEVINE & CAMPBELL, supra note 36, at 16. 
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74 GEORGE B. VOLD & THOMAS J. BERNARD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 274 (3d ed. 1986). 
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United States, it is commonly said, “[t]his is a [nation] of laws, not of 
men.”76  Law can be seen as collectivizing the ideals, aspirations and 
power of a group of people.  The criminal law is, among other things, an 
expression, albeit a compromised and incomplete expression, of the shared 
meanings, morality and aspirations of the tribe.77 
There is another, more concrete sense in which criminal law is group 
self-defining.  Every group has “law” or rules (whether written or 
unwritten) for membership in the group and rules that describe the rights 
and obligations of group members.  The criminal law, in particular, places 
behavioral prerequisites on inclusion in the group:  If you are to be a 
member of this tribe, you must not do X (e.g. murder, rape, steal, etc.)  If 
you violate this rule, you will no longer be a member of this tribe.  In other 
words, criminal law, in setting the boundaries of acceptable behavior 
within the group, draws a demarcation line around the group.  Violations of 
those boundaries result in symbolic or actual exclusion from the tribe—
”whether by expulsion, incarceration, ostracism or execution.”78  
Banishment, deportation, imprisonment, and execution all require 
literal exclusion of the rule-breaker from the group.  Other punishments 
may remove only some aspect or privilege of group membership, e.g., a 
license to drive, the right to vote, or the right to child custody.79   Branding 
and shaming punishments symbolically strip the offender of their 
humanity.  The dehumanization of those who violate our group’s criminal 
law is well-illustrated in the metaphors of slime and filth applied to 
convicts and prisoners in cases that span more than one hundred years.80 
Even the attachment of the label “criminal” to the person who has 
committed the prohibited act constitutes symbolic exclusion from the tribe.  
The criminal is an outcast.  The criminal is a public enemy.  The criminal 
is sub-human. Using the label “criminal” (or “thief”, “junkie”, etc.) to 
describe the wrong-doer symbolically deprives the individual of his or her 
humanity and group membership.81  
This is important because it not only identifies him or her as a person 
worthy of punishment and/or ostracism, but also identifies him or her as 
someone who is not worthy of the concern or care of the in-group 
members.  Notice that the conditions of imprisonment—”cold, remorseless 
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deprivation”—generally do not worry the general public when the person 
being treated in this way has been labeled a “criminal.”82  Group members 
are freed from guilt or remorse about the treatment of the convicted person 
by the thought that the “criminal” deserves punishment and is not human, 
not my tribe, not like me.  As David Garland points out in his exploration 
of public torture lynchings, “we tend to underestimate the extent to which 
socially adjusted ‘normal’ people can be indifferent to, or take vicarious 
pleasure in, the suffering of others with whom they do not identify. . . .”83 
It is easier to punish members of the out-group. A recent cross-national 
analysis of imprisonment rates in 140 nations concluded that social 
heterogeneity (based on race, ethnicity, religion and language) was 
positively associated with imprisonment rates.84  Similarly, lesser diversity 
was associated with the abolition of capital punishment.85  Another study 
of thirteen progressive democracies concluded that “expansions in minority 
presence and the resulting threats to majority group dominance combine to 
produce increasingly punitive outcomes.”86  Similarly, a recent 
comparative study of community attitudes toward punishment in the Czech 
Republic and Florida found that “antipathy toward minority ‘others’ is a 
strong predictor of punitiveness . . . .”87  The study considered attitudes 
toward African Americans in Florida and Gypsies and refugees in the 
Czech Republic.  In spite of the vast cultural and historical differences 
between the minority groups in these communities, members of both 
majority tribes exhibited a more punitive attitude toward the minority 
“other.”88  
Punishment itself works to establish and maintain group identity and to 
reinforce group values.  Denunciation of the criminal act (and the 
“criminal”) reinforces group identity and group values.  According to 
Garfinkel, the moral indignation of the tribe is expressed through a “status 
degradation ceremony.”89  The attributes of a “successful degradation 
ceremony,” require the denouncer to “make the dignity of the supra-
personal values of the tribe salient and accessible to view, and his 
denunciation must be delivered in their name.”90  Punishment separates the 
group from the punished person and helps to maintain positive group 
identity.  Among the “beneficial side-effects” of criminal punishment is the 
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restoration of social cohesion “which may be threatened or disturbed by 
certain sorts of offending . . . .”91  Although social cohesion may be 
construed as a social good, Garland points out that punishment produces “a 
distinctive form of solidarity: ‘the emotional solidarity of aggression.’”92  
This particular solidarity has been termed “a form of tribal group 
hostility.”93   
Further, criminal prosecution creates a sense of group well-being by 
placing the blame for harmful or painful events on an individual.  This 
allows the in-group to be a victim rather than a perpetrator of evil (the bad 
thing that happened is not our fault, it is the fault of the criminal).  Placing 
the blame on the individual exonerates the in-group from responsibility for 
criminogenic social conditions.  In this way the “features of the mad-dog 
murderer reverse the features of the peaceful citizen”94 and the in-group 
members are permitted to maintain a positive group identity.  By placing 
the blame for harmful or painful events on an individual, by denouncing a 
“perpetrator” and indentifying a “victim,” the group is distanced from the 
harm, absolved of any potential blame, and made to feel safe again.   
B. The Creation of an Oppositional Minority 
Because the criminal law represents the stated ideology and morals of 
the majority group, the law itself may evoke oppositional ideology within 
the minority. 
 
When a group perceives (correctly or not) that it is the 
object of repression, it responds by opposing the moral 
categories and social meanings of the repressive group.  
Groups, defined by class or other status categories, engage 
in struggles to vindicate ideological systems and so to 
vindicate   themselves.95 
 
Minority groups are their own in-group.  For the minority, majority is 
the out-group, whose rules may not be considered legitimate or requiring 
of obedience.  When the minority group perceives the law as a tool of 
oppression, mistrust not only makes individuals less likely to assist law 
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enforcement, but also more likely to disobey legal commands.96  Rather 
than produce the desired deterrent effect for the minority group, the law 
backfires.  Butler argues, for example, that the high incarceration rate of 
African Americans has led some, particularly the “hip-hop community” to 
“interrogate the social meaning of punishment.”97 
  
To say that hip-hop destigmatizes incarceration 
understates the point: Prison, according to the artists, 
actually stigmatizes the government.  In a culture that 
celebrates rebelliousness, prison is the place for unruly 
“niggas” who otherwise would upset the political or 
economic status quo.  In this sense, inmates are heroic 
figures.98 
 
Intergroup conflict, competition, antagonism or lack of understanding 
can make it easier for either group to disrespect the norms and liberty of 
members of the other group.   
V. BUILDING SUPER-TRIBAL GROUPS AND NORMS 
Writers on ethnocentrism are divided on the question of whether in-
group preference produces primarily positive or negative effects.  In-group 
favoritism and out-group antagonism may have helped our ancestors 
“protect limited resources and increase the survival rate of one’s own 
family.”99  If we re-envision the criminal law in the context of a human 
species that existed for more than a hundred thousand years in semi-
isolated, small, roving bands, that has lived together in concentrated and 
semi-permanent groups for only tens of thousands of years,100 and that now 
finds itself crowded into an increasingly small planet, the diminishing 
value of in-group loyalty and out-group antagonism becomes apparent.  As 
the world becomes a smaller neighborhood, the societies that develop ways 
to diffuse intergroup conflict and forge inclusive group identities are more 
likely to achieve greater justice. 
The problem of developing multicultural or super-tribal norms is both 
difficult and important.  As McNamara points out, the concept is often 
greeted as a call for the minority group to receive “special treatment.”101   
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The idea of using different norms to apply to different cultural groups 
within one society runs afoul of the concept of the rule of law and 
“principles of equality before the law and equal protection before the 
law.”102  On the other hand, the norms and values of sub-groups or sub-
cultures may be irreconcilable.  Further, in practice, extending the 
protection of the dominant tribe’s criminal law to minority groups has 
raised troubling issues.  The extension of police protection to minority 
neighborhoods may require the police to increase patrols and, 
consequently, increase the probability of abrasive encounters.103  Some of 
the resulting conflicts have been notorious.  For example, in Chicago 
during the early 1960s and again a quarter of a century later, police made a 
practice of picking up African American youth, whom they suspected of 
criminal activity, and dropping them off in white neighborhoods where 
they were likely to be beaten up by local residents.104 
Nevertheless, building a more inclusive tribe is not necessarily a 
utopian dream.  The point is illustrated in an editorial by an American 
journalist: 
 
There was a time in [the US] when we accepted a 
separate standard of justice for whites and blacks, and a 
time when we rarely bothered to prosecute an immigrant 
so long as his crime was committed against one of his own 
kind. Whatever they did in Chinatown or Little Italy on a 
Saturday night—whatever they did to their wives and 
daughters, in particular—was their business. As a society, 
we gradually turned against that approach, accepting, in 
the name of fundamental fairness and our common 
humanity, the notion that a black American, or a Greek, or 
an Irish or a Chinese immigrant who falls victim to a crime 
is entitled to the same safeguards as a native-born white.105  
 
Notice that, for this writer, the concession that the minority group 
members deserved the protection of the criminal law required an 
affirmation of their “common humanity.”  Extending the protection of the 
law to immigrants required bringing them within the boundaries of the 
group. 
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This Article does not propose to solve the difficult problem of how to 
reconcile cultural conflicts.  It does propose, however, that the first step 
toward being able to deal with any problem is to recognize and understand 
it.  The temptation to characterize the criminal law systems of nation-states 
as “modern” or “civilized” may shield some of the aspects of those systems 
from scrutiny and give them pride of place in contests between the norms 
of sub-national groups.  It may also support an unjustified assumption that 
modern legal systems are insulated from basic human drives and emotions.  
Acknowledging criminal law’s tribalism—that is, acknowledging the 
continuity of in-group preference and identity formation in the dynamics of 
criminal law and justice systems—may serve to put the norms of various 
sub-groups on a more level playing field and open the discipline to broader 
scrutiny.   
Considering the law in light of group behavioral science, for example, 
opens the door to further thinking about the impact of psychology on group 
decision-making processes.  Can criminal legal processes be insulated from 
implicit bias?  In the context of civil law, Sunstein favors procedures that 
introduce more deliberation in legal decision-making and to insulate the 
process from implicit bias or flawed group decision-making.106  In the 
context of criminal law legislation, that might mean delaying the 
enactment of new criminal legislation until a minority impact report can be 
debated and drafted.  In the context of criminal procedures, it may be 
possible to devise other ways to insulate decision-making from in-group 
bias.  Strategies for building intergroup solidarity may emerge from a 
variety of sources.  At least one social psychology study of intergroup 
relations has found that the development of a common group identity 
diffuses the effects of stigmatization and improves intergroup attitudes.107   
Strategies for building multi-ethnic affinity and super-group solidarity may 
come from anywhere in the world and from a variety of disciplines.108 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A number of studies have looked for and failed to find empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that disproportionate incarceration rates are 
caused by biased decision-making on the part of police, prosecutors, and 
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judges.109  On the other hand, research has documented that increased 
minority presence or minority threat to group dominance is strongly 
correlated with imprisonment rates.110  Based on current sociological data, 
it is not possible to quantify how discriminatory processing affects 
minority imprisonment.  On the other hand, given the apparent 
disproportionate imprisonment of minority groups around the world, it is 
fair to say that every justice system around the globe operates in a way (or 
perhaps in a context) that favors the in-group over the out-group. 
Disproportionate punishment of some minority groups is a global 
phenomenon that may operate without the conscious awareness of the 
participants.  The particular in-group preference may be manifest through 
the institutionalized operation of racialized power, class distinction, ethnic 
or religious animosity, or anti-immigrant sentiment.  All of these, however, 
are species of an ethnocentric impulse which constitutes part of the 
traditional role and function of the criminal law itself: to define and 
reinforce in-group identity. 
Criminal law and justice systems evolve and change, but have not lost 
their tribal quality.  The attribution of modernity to contemporary Western 
criminal legal systems may provide the appearance of distance from tribal 
manifestations of unequal justice, but may, in fact, perpetuate its own kind 
of color line—separating the “modern, enlightened West” from the “tribal, 
religious” others.111   
Identifying the continuity of tribalism in criminal law across time and 
cultures is not meant as an apology or justification of it.  Instead, it sets out 
an agenda of building the super-group norms of a global tribe of 
interconnected humanity.  This may be seen as a core task of the 
internationalist legal agenda.  On a smaller scale, however, it is the 
responsibility of each multi-ethnic society.  
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